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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ronald L. Coleman appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of sexual abuse of child under the age of 16. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In May 2009, 35-year-old Coleman exposed his penis to seven-year-old 
T.P., the daughter of Coleman's close friend. (Tr., p.84, L.9 - p.85, L.25, p.200, 
L.23-p.203, L.6, p.216, Ls.6-12, p.222, L.11-p.223, L.21. 1) Coleman andT.P. 
were playing alone together in a junkyard when they found, among other things, 
a calendar containing pictures of topless women. (Tr., p.70, L.6 - p.74, L.7.) 
Coleman asked T.P. what she liked about the pictures, and he compared the 
stomach of one of the women in the calendar to T.P.'s stomach. (Tr., p.74, L.12 
- p. 76, L.18.) Coleman began talking to T. P. about sex and said, "I wish you 
were my age so I can just do it." (Tr., p.77, L.12 - p.78, L.21.) He talked to T.P. 
about her anatomy and told her she had a "s-e-x hole" and that "boys lick it." 
(Tr., p.79, Ls.3-25, p.81, Ls.19-20.) He also told T.P. that "the girl goes on top of 
him, and he pushes up and down" (Tr., p.81, Ls.23-25), and that women get 
pregnant by having sex (Tr., p.84, Ls.3-8). While talking to T.P. about sex, 
1 At Coleman's request, several transcripts were prepared and included in the 
record on appeal. All "Tr." references contained herein are to the bound volume 
containing transcripts of the jury trial held December 1-3, 2009, and the 
sentencing hearing held March 3, 2010. The transcript containing the parties' 
closing arguments is cited herein as "12/3/09 Tr." 
1 
Coleman pulled T.P.'s legs apart and touched her "private."2 (Tr., p.80, L.1 -
p.81, L.18.) He told T.P. "not to tell anyone what [they] talked about." (Tr., 
p.131, Ls.7-22.) 
At the end of the conversation, Coleman announced, "It's time to go pee." 
(Tr., p.84, Ls.9-25.) He walked from the driver's side of the abandoned car in 
which he and T.P. were sitting to the passenger side where T.P. was still seated 
and urinated in front of her, exposing his penis to her in the process. (Tr., p.85, 
Ls.2-25.) Referring to his penis, Coleman asked T.P. if she "wanted to hold it." 
(Tr., p.85, Ls.22-25.) T.P. said, "No," and told Coleman she was going home. 
(Tr., p.87, Ls.9-12, p.89, Ls.14-24.) When T.P. got home she told her mother 
what had happened. (Tr., p.91, Ls.5-17.) Her mother, in turn, called T.P.'s 
f~th~~ ~n...J H .. - -0 1·,-e ('~ p n1 I - "8 '"lt:: - 2" 0  I 2" - 21' I C'Q - '">6n 1 ,in aIcIaruurcJJ IL,. 11., . .:J ,L::..I -LJ,fJ. I ,L. I-JJ. 1,L. ,fJ.L U,L.l'i::J 
- p.261, L.B.) 
The state charged Coleman with sexual abuse of a child under the age of 
16.3 (R., pp.18-19.) Prior to trial, the state gave notice of its intent to offer expert 
testimony "concerning grooming behaviors of pedophiles as it pertains to child 
victims of sexual assaults." (R., pp.35-41b.) The state also gave notice of its 
intent to introduce evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b) that, on two separate 
2 T.P. testified that she perceived the touching of her "private" to have been an 
accident because it happened very quickly and Coleman immediately 
apologized. (Tr., p.81, Ls.4-18, p.171, L.19-p.173, L.13.) 
3 The state subsequently amended the Information to include a lewd conduct 
charge that was originally alleged in the criminal complaint and on which 
Coleman was also bound over following a preliminary hearing. (R., pp.8-9, 16, 
24-27.) The lewd conduct charge was ultimately dismissed, however, because 
Coleman was not arraigned on that charge before trial. (Tr., p.310, L.16 - p.312, 
L. 7, p.317, L.10 - p.319, L.2, p.329, Ls.22-25.) 
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occasions approximately one year before the charged crime, Coleman engaged 
in inappropriate behavior with the victim. (R., pp.60-61.) Specifically, the state 
sought to present evidence that: 
1. In the late summer or fall of 2008, at the home of the victim's 
father, the victim [T.P.J, who was 6 years old at the time, woke her 
father and stepmother up in the middle of the night, sobbing. She 
was upset because she perceived that [Coleman}, who was a guest 
in her father's house, was taking her pants off after she had fallen 
asleep while in [Coleman's] bedroom. [Coleman] indicated to her 
father that he was trying to help her put her pajamas on; however, 
[Coleman's} bedroom was on the other end of the house from 
[T.P.'sJ bedroom, and [Coleman} did not have [T.P.'s] pajamas with 
him in his room .... 
2. Between May 2008 and September, 2008, at Mike Gavia's 
home in Custer County, Idaho, [Coleman], [T.P.], and (T.P.'sJ father 
and stepmother had a bonfire. As the bonfire subsided, [T.P.'s] 
father and stepmother took [T.P 'sJ younger step siblings into the 
house to prepare them for bed, leaving [Coleman] and [T.P.] at the 
fire. [T.P.] soon came into the house, very upset, because 
[Coleman] was pressing her to talk about [her] stepfather, a topic 
she did not like discussing. [T.P.'s] father confronted [Coleman], 
informing him that pressing [T.P.] on this topic was causing her 
distress, and that, when [T.P.] told [Coleman] she did not want to 
talk about, or do certain things, (Coleman] should immediately stop. 
(R., pp.60-61.) The state asserted that the proffered I.R. 404(b) evidence was 
relevant to show that Coleman "groomed" T.P. i.e., that he "created 
opportunities to be alone with T.P. at night, as he did in the charged offense," 
that "he engaged in behavior calculated to make [T.P.] feel uncomfortable," and 
that he had the intent to touch T.P. sexually. (R., pp.60-61; Tr., p.5, Ls.2-23.) 
Coleman filed a motion in limine to exclude both the proffered I.R.E 
404(b) evidence and the expert testimony concerning grooming behaviors. (R., 
pp.62-63.) At the hearing on his motion, Coleman argued that the 404(b) acts 
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were too remote in time to the charged offense to be relevant and that they were 
more prejudicial than probative. (Tr., p.2, L.14 - p.3, L.25.) He argued that the 
proffered expert testimony regarding grooming behaviors was not relevant, would 
not assist the jury and would invade the province of the jury as to T.P.'s 
credibility. (Tr., p.4, Ls.1-9, p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.9.) 
The district court ultimately denied Coleman's motion in limine and 
allowed the state to present the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and expert testimony in 
its case-in-chief. (Tr., p.24, L.8 - p.25, L.10, p.59, Ls.18-25, p.114, Ls.16-24.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Coleman guilty of sexual abuse of a 
child under the age of 16. (R., p.87.) The district court entered a judgment of 
conviction (R., pp.115-16), from which Coleman timely appealed (R., pp.120-22). 
4 
ISSUES 
Coleman states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court violate Idaho Rules of Evidence 401 
and 403? 
2. Did the district court err in allowing the State to present 
404(b) grooming evidence that was either not relevant or 
overly prejudicial and, if so, in allowing an expert to testify 
regarding grooming practices? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
Has Coleman failed to show error in the district court's evidentiary rulings? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Coleman Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Evidentiary Rulings 
A. Introduction 
Coleman challenges the district court's evidentiary rulings on a number of 
bases. First, he contends that the district court violated I.R.E. 401 and 403 and 
committed reversible error by failing to articulate on the record the bases for its 
decision to admit the state's proffered I.R. 404(b) evidence. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 7-8.) Alternatively, he argues that the district court erred in admitting the 
state's I.R. 404(b) evidence, contending the evidence was "either not relevant 
or overly prejudicial." (Appellant's brief, pp.9-14.) Finally, he argues that the 
district court erred by admitting the expert testimony on grooming behaviors 
that testimony was relevant only to the l.R. 404(b) evidence, which 
Coleman contends was improperly admitted. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-16.) 
Coleman's arguments fail. The district court was not required to articulate on the 
record the bases for its admissibility determinations, and a review of the record 
and the applicable law supports the district court's implicit determinations that the 
proffered evidence was both relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under LR 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
6 
1185, 1187 (2009). A trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony 
will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. 
State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1998); State v. 
Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 855, 828 P.2d 879, 884 (1992); State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 
352, 355, 806 P.2d 445, 448 (1991 ); State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 414, 3 
P.3d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 2000). 
C. The District Court Was Not Required To Articulate On The Record The 
Bases For Its Admissibility Determinations 
Prior to trial, the state gave notice of its intent to introduce evidence, 
pursuant to 1.R.E. 404(b), of two specific incidents, each of which occurred 
approximately one year before the charged crime, in which Coleman had 
engaged in inappropriate behavim with the victim, T.P. (R., pp.60-61.) In the 
first incident, Coleman removed T.P .'s pants after T.P. had fallen asleep in 
Coleman's bedroom (the "pants incident"). (R., pp.60-61.) In the second 
incident, Coleman upset T.P. by "pressing her to talk about [herJ stepfather, a 
topic she did not like discussing," while Coleman was alone with T.P. at a bonfire 
(the "bonfire incident"). (R., p.61.) 
Coleman moved in limine to exclude the proffered I.RE. 404(b) evidence, 
arguing that it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. (R., pp.62-63; Tr., p.2, L.14 
- p.3, L.25, p.56, Ls.6-24.) After an offer of proof, during which T.P. testified 
regarding the uncharged incidents (Tr., p.24, L.7 - p.52, L.1), and after hearing 
the arguments of the parties (Tr., p.52, L.5 - p.59, L.4), the district court ruled, 
"I'm going to deny the motion in limine with regard to the pants incident" (Tr., 
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p.59, Ls.18-20.) The court took the admissibility of the bonfire incident under 
advisement "for the evening" and advised the parties, "I will announce that 
decision first thing in the morning." (Tr., p.59, Ls.20-25.) 
The next day, the trial commenced with T.P. taking the stand and 
testifying both about the charged conduct and about the uncharged pants and 
bonfire incidents that were the subject of the State's I.R.E. 404(b) notice and 
Coleman's motion in limine. (Tr., p.61, L.1 - p.113, L.21.) After T.P. testified 
about the uncharged incidents, the district court took a recess and noted for the 
record: "I had indicated to both counsel this morning before testimony began 
that I would allow [T.P.] to testify about the incidents that were the subject of the 
motion in limine that I had not ruled on last evening." (Tr., p.114, Ls.13-24.) 
On appeal, Coleman argues that the district court erred by admitting the 
proffered I.RE. 404(b) evidence without conducting an analysis of the 
"evidence's relevance or potential prejudicial effect" on the record. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.7-8.) To support his claim, Coleman relies primarily on State v. Ruiz, 
150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010), wherein the Idaho Supreme 
Court held it was error for a trial court to exclude relevant evidence, without first 
conducting an I.RE. 403 analysis of whether the probative value of the evidence 
was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. However, 
Coleman's reliance on Ruiz is misplaced for at least two reasons. 
First, contrary to Coleman's suggestion, Ruiz does not stand for the broad 
proposition that a trial court errs as a matter of law by failing to articulate for the 
record the bases for its evidentiary rulings. The district court in Ruiz prohibited 
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the defense from cross-examining a state's witness regarding the mandatory 
minimum prison sentence the witness avoided by agreeing to testify against Ruiz 
at trial. Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 722. The district court 
acknowledged that the evidence was relevant but, without any further analysis, 
categorically excluded the evidence, stating: "You can't talk about minimum 
mandatories." !fl Noting that the Idaho Rules of Evidence expressly provide 
that "[a]II relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided" by rule, 
the Idaho Supreme Court held the trial court erred by excluding the admittedly 
relevant evidence without first conducting an I.R.E. 403 analysis. Specifically, 
the Court stated: 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." Idaho R. Evid. 403. To exclude evidence 
under Rule 403, the trial court must address whether the probative 
value is substantially outweighed by one of the considerations 
listed in the Rule. [State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 241, 220 P.3d 
1055, 1060 (2009)}. The district court here did not conduct that 
analysis. It merely said, "You can't talk about minimum 
mandatories." After Ruiz's counsel objected, the court added, "I 
think that the court has a delicate line to walk between what you 
are allowed to do in terms of credibility and the fact that the jury is 
not to be advised of the penalties that the defendant might face, if 
convicted." Because ii exciuded ihe evidence without conducting 
the analysis required by Rule 403, the district court erred. Id. 
Ruiz, 150 idaho ai471, 248 P.3d ai722. 
Nothing in the Ruiz opinion mandates the conclusion, suggested by 
Coleman, that a trial court errs as a matter of law by failing to articulate the 
bases of its evidentiary rulings on the record. Rather, Ruiz stands only for the 
proposition that a trial court errs by excluding relevant evidence without first 
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determining that such evidence is inadmissible pursuant to I.R.E. 403. In this 
case, the district court admitted the state's proffered I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and, 
in so doing, implicitly determined that the evidence was relevant and not made 
inadmissible by the provisions of I.R. 403. It is well settled that this Court will 
uphold the implicit determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the 
record and the applicable law. State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427, 432, 34 P.3d 
1110, 1115 (Ct. App. 2001 ); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 788, 979 P.2d 
659, 661 (Ct. App. 1999) (appellate court will review "implicit" findings where trial 
court does not articulate findings on record). It is equally well settled that, "[i]f a 
district court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will 
affirm the order upon the correct theory." State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 365, 373, 93 
P.3d 696, 704 (2004) (citing McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 
144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 Idaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 
(1997)). Because this Court is capable of reviewing the trial court's admissibility 
determination without knowing the specifics of the district court's thought 
process, and because nothing in the Ruiz opinion compels the conclusion that 
the court was required to expressly articulate the bases of its evidentiary rulings 
for the record, Coleman has failed to establish any basis for reversal. 
In addition to being legally lnapposite, Ruiz is also factually 
distinguishable. As discussed above, the district court in Ruiz failed to conduct 
any I.RE. 403 analysis before excluding otherwise relevant evidence. Coleman 
argues that the district court in this case "totally failed to analyze the evidence as 
required under either Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 or 403" (Appellant's brief, p.8), 
10 
but this assertion finds no support in the record. Before admitting the proffered 
evidence, the district court required the state to make an offer of proof and 
entertained extensive argument regarding the probative value and potential 
prejudicial effect of the evidence. Although the court did not expressly state on 
the record that it found the evidence relevant and not unduly prejudicial, it is 
clear from the context of the entire record that the court actually engaged in that 
analysis. This is evidenced, in part, by the fact that the court ultimately gave a 
limiting instruction cautioning the jury that it could only consider the proffered 
evidence as proof of Coleman's opportunity, intent and plan to commit the 
charged crime. R., p.77.) Presumably, had the court not analyzed the 
probative value and potential prejudicial effect of the evidence, no such 
instruction would have been given. Moreover, it is apparent from court's ovm 
statements that it announced its ruling regarding the admissibility of a portion of 
the proffered I.R. 404(b) evidence off the record. Because it did so, it is 
impossible to know whether the court articulated the bases for its ruling at that 
time. However, in the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, this 
Court must not presume that the district court erred. 
Idaho 643,644, 570 P.2d 1333, 1334 ("1977). 
State v. Sima, 98 
D. Coleman Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Admitting The I.R.E. 404(b) Evidence 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of the defendant in an attempt to show he or she committed the crime 
for which he or she is on trial. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 
11 
1188 (2009). However, such evidence is admissible for other purposes, 
including proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 
Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 
647, 651 (Ct. App. 1989). Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is 
relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's character, and (b) its 
probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the 
probability of unfair prejudice. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 
227, 230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the 
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003). 
The district court denied Coleman's motion in !imine and permitted the 
state to present evidence that, approximately one year before the charged crime, 
Coleman pulled down T.P.'s pants after she fell asleep in his room and, on a 
separate occasion, upset T.P. by "pressing her to talk about [her] stepfather, a 
topic she did not like discussing," while Coleman was alone with T.P. at a 
bonfire. (R., pp.60-61; Tr., p.59, Ls.18-25, p.114, Ls.16-24.) On appeal, 
Coieman does not chalienge the relevancy of the pants incident, but he argues 
"[e]vidence of Mr. Coleman's alleged behavior of upsetting T.P. during a bonfire 
a year prior to the date of the charged crime did not make it more or less 
probable that he had committed the charged crime." (Appellant's brief, p.12.) 
He also contends that, even if "evidence that Mr. Coleman had pulled down 
T.P.'s pants and upset her at a bonfire was relevant, the evidence was not 
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admissible because the evidence was more prejudicial than probative." 
(Appellant's brief, p.13 (capitalization altered, underlining omitted).) Coleman's 
arguments fail. Application of the law to the facts of this case shows that the 
challenged evidence was relevant to prove Coleman's intent and plan to commit 
the charged crime and supports the district court's implicit determination that the 
evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. 
1. Evidence That Coleman Upset T.P. By Pressuring Her To Discuss 
A Distressing Topic While Alone With Her At A Bonfire Was 
Relevant To The Issue Of Coleman's Intent And Plan To Commit 
The Charged Offense 
Pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be 
admitted when relevant to show the defendant's intent and/or plan to commit the 
charged offense. l.R.E. 404(b); State v. Gomez,_ idaho _, 254 P.3d 47, 53 
(Ct. App. 2011) (review denied 7/7/11); State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 722, 
249 P.3d 1169, 1177 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 19-20, 
878 P.2d 188, 193-94 (Ct. App. 1994). In sex abuse cases, evidence that the 
defendant has engaged in prior sexual misconduct with the victim, or has 
otherwise engaged in conduct designed to "groom" the victim for sexual 
exploitation "is particularly relevant where it demonstrates a progression of 
abuse, as the conduct actually charged may be only a part of the process." 
Gomez,_ Idaho at_ n.3, 254 P.3d at 54 n.3; see also Truman, 150 Idaho 
at 722, 249 P .3d at 1177 (holding evidence of Truman's uncharged behaviors 
toward the victim, "including his first sexual comments towards her when she 
was twelve years old, showing her pornography, the use of rewards and 
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punishments depending on whether she gave in to his sexual demands, as well 
as the sexual acts the two engaged in was admissible evidence establishing 
Truman's continuing criminal design to cultivate a relationship with T.S. such that 
she would concede to his sexual demands, also known as 'grooming"' and 
constituted "evidence of steps allegedly effectuating a plan to accomplish the 
charged offenses"); Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 19, 878 P.2d at 193 (holding 
evidence of Blackstead's drug use with the victim, in the interval between sexual 
assaults, "was probative of a continuing criminal design by Blackstead to 
cultivate a relationship with [the victim], induce her submission to his sexual 
demands and procure her silence through use of drugs - a process which the 
district court referred to as 'grooming"'). "Therefore, in cases where the 
uncharged criminal acts of the defendant vv'ere in furtherance of an underlying 
plan to commit the charged crime, those acts are ... admissible to show the 
accomplishment of the criminal goal." Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 19, 878 P.2d at 
193. 
Although Coleman argues otherwise (Appellant's brief, p.12), evidence 
that, approximately one year before the charged offense, Coleman upset T.P. by 
pressing her to talk about her stepfather while alone with her at a bonfire was 
relevant to show Coleman's intent and plan to commit the charged crime. The 
evidence was not admitted in isolation. Rather, it was admitted together with 
evidence that, during the same general timeframe, Coleman attempted to 
remove T.P.'s pants while she was alone with him in his room. Coleman does 
not challenge the relevancy of the pants incident. Viewed together, that incident 
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and the challenged bonfire incident show a pattern of grooming and an ongoing 
criminal design to accomplish the charged offense. 
As noted by the state's expert in this case, an individual may groom a 
victim for sexual exploitation in a variety of ways. "Grooming might entail things 
that are in and of themselves fairly innocuous, such as treats, prizes, going to get 
an ice cream cone, spending special time together." (Tr., p.244, Ls.16-19.) 
However, the grooming process generally "progresses from the innocuous to 
things that violate a child's boundary, that a child may be uncomfortable with, 
that a child normally would not expect from [an) adult who doesn't have an 
intimate relationship with them." (Tr., p.244, Ls.20-24.) "Desensitizing a child to 
violated boundaries ... [is) a significant part of grooming." (Tr., p.245, Ls.1-11.) 
Such "boundar1 violations can be topical, discussing things that are not 
appropriate to discuss with a child. They can also be the special relationship, 
treats type of behavior." (Tr., p.245, Ls.12-15.) Generally speaking, an increase 
in physical contact is also part of the grooming process. (Tr., p.245, Ls.19-20.) 
Individuals who groom children for sexual exploitation look for children to whom 
they have access, often because the individual has a trusting relationship with 
Hie child's caregiver. (Tr., p.246, Ls.2-20, p.247, L.·19 - p.248, L.9.) Grooming 
behaviors generally cease when the sexual contact is discovered or when the 
individual who is engaging in the grooming behavior no longer has access to the 
child. (Tr., p.248, L.24 - p.249, L.10.) Discussion of inappropriate topics, 
isolation from caregivers and a large age difference may together be indicators 
of grooming. (Tr., p.249, L.11 - p.251, L.13.) 
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Based on the foregoing, there can be little question that evidence of the 
bonfire incident, together with evidence of the pants incident, was relevant to 
show the process by which Coleman was attempting to groom T.P. for sexual 
contact. The testimony at trial established that Coleman knew before he talked 
to T.P. at the bonfire that she did not like discussing her stepfather. (Tr., p.204, 
L.13 - p.206, L.22.) In fact, T.P.'s father had told Coleman on "multiple" prior 
occasions "not to discuss anything to do with [T.P.'s stepfather] or anything that 
she's uncomfortable talking about." (Tr., p.206, Ls.6-22.) Nevertheless, when 
left alone with T.P. at the bonfire, Coleman initiated a conversation about T.P.'s 
stepfather, ultimately causing T.P. to become upset and retreat to her house to 
seek comfort from her father and stepmother. (Tr., p.103, L.3 - p.105, L.13, 
p.193, L.23 - p.196, L.18, p.208, L.12 - p.210, L.3.) Duifng the same genera: 
timeframe, Coleman attempted to remove T.P.'s pants after she fell asleep in his 
room. (Tr., p.105, L.21-p.109, L.23, p.210, L.21-p.211, L.7.) Following this 
incident, T.P.'s father and stepmother made the decision to no longer leave T.P. 
alone with Coleman. (Tr., p.212, L.22 - p.213, L.10.) Approximately one year 
later, when T.P.'s father was out of town and T.P. was staying with her mother, 
Coleman was permitted to be alone with T.P. and committed the charged 
offense. (Tr., p.213, Ls.11-14.) 
Viewed in context, evidence of the bonfire incident was probative of 
Coleman's intent and "continuing criminal design to cultivate a relationship with 
[T.P.] such that she would concede to his sexual demands." Truman, 150 Idaho 
at 722, 249 P.3d at 1177; see also Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 19, 878 P.2d at 
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193. Evidence that Coleman seized an opportunity while alone with T.P. to talk 
to her about a topic he knew made her uncomfortable showed a willingness by 
Coleman to violate T.P.'s "topical" boundaries. This evidence was especially 
probative when considered in light of the evidence, that during the same general 
time period, Coleman violated T.P.'s physical and personal boundaries by 
attempting to remove her pants and, at the next opportunity to be alone with her, 
committed the charged offense by exposing his penis to T.P. and asking her if 
she wanted to hold it. Because the bonfire incident was part of a pattern of 
conduct that showed escalating boundary violations and, ultimately, a 
progression of abuse, the evidence was relevant to show the steps Coleman 
took accomplish the charged offense. Gomez,_ Idaho at_ n.3, 254 P.3d at 
54 n.3; Truman, 150 Idaho at 722, 249 P.3d at 1171, Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 
19-20, 878 P .2d at 193-94. 
2. The Probative Value Of The Challenged Evidence Was Not Substantially 
Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Preiudice 
Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if, in the 
district court's discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice -- which is the tendency 
to suggest a decision on an improper basis -- substantially outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence. State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 
720, 722 (2010); State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 907 (Ct. 
App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 
1993). As previously explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if the probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The 
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rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant 
evidence. 
State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) 
(emphasis in original). 
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely 
prejudicial in the sense of being detrimental to a party's case. See State v. 
Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) ("Certainly that evidence 
was prejudicial to the defendant, however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial 
is demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the state, and thus results in 
prejudice to a defendant."). Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that 
is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a decision on an 
improper basis. Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. 
Coleman contends that the district court abused its discretion in admitting 
the state's proffered !.R.E. 404(b) evidence, arguing that, even if relevant, 
evidence of the bonfire incident and pants incident was more prejudicial than 
probative and, as such, should have been excluded under I.R.E. 403. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) Specifically, Coleman argues that evidence of the 
bonfire incident was unduly prejudicial because it "worked to poison the minds of 
the jury against" him by "paint[ing] him in an unfavorable light, as a cruel person 
who likes to upset children." (Appellant's brief, pp.13-14.) He argues that 
evidence of the pants incident was "highly prejudicial and inflammatory" because 
it portrayed him "as an individual who has struggled with improper sexual urges 
in the past." (Appellant's brief, p.14.) The record demonstrates, however, that 
Coleman's claims of unfair prejudice are unfounded. 
As previously discussed, evidence of the bonfire incident and pants 
incident was particularly probative because it showed a progression of abuse 
and demonstrated Coleman's intent and plan to groom T.P. for sexual contact. 
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See Section D.1., supra. Although Coleman argues that the evidence was 
inflammatory, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury construed it as such, 
or that admission of the evidence caused the jury to render its verdict on an 
improper basis. Neither the bonfire incident nor the pants incident involved any 
sexual contact and, as such, did not carry the risk attendant in many other sex 
abuse cases that the jury might convict based solely on the defendant's 
propensity to engage in conduct like that charged. Rather, the evidence in this 
case was offered solely for the purpose of establishing that Coleman groomed 
the victim for ultimate sexual contact (R., pp.60-61 ), and that is the only purpose 
for which the state argued the relevance of that evidence to the jury (12/3/09 Tr., 
p.225, L.22 - p.227, L.21, p.243, L.17 p.244, L.9). To the extent there still 
existed any potential for unfair prejudice resulting from the admission of the 
evidence, such was ameliorated by the court's limiting instruction that expressly 
directed the jury it could only consider the evidence as proof of Coleman's 
opportunity, intent and plan to commit the charged crime. (See R., p. 77.) 
Presuming as this Court must that the jury followed this instruction, M..:,, Gomez, 
Idaho at 254 P.3d at 57; State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 751, 947 P.2d 
420, 424 (Ct. App. 1997), there is no reasonable possibility that the admission of 
the evidence caused the jury to convict Coleman on an improper basis. 
Because the proffered LR. 404(b) evidence was reievant to matters 
other than propensity and not unfairly prejudicial, Coleman has failed to establish 
that the district court abused its discretion by admitting it. 
E. Coleman Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Admitting The Expert Testimony 
Expert testimony is admissible if it "assist[s] the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 81, 
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175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also I.R.E. 702. Coleman 
argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the 
expert testimony on grooming behaviors because that testimony was relevant 
only to the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, which Coleman contends was improperly 
admitted. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-16.) For the reasons set forth in Section D, 
supra, the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was properly admitted. Because Coleman 
concedes that the expert's testimony was relevant to help the jury understand 
that evidence, he has failed to show any abuse of discretion in the admission of 
that testimony. 
F. Even If The District Court Erred In Its Evidentiary Rulings, Such Error Is 
Harmless 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 
52. "The inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would 
have convicted [the defendant} even without the admission of the challenged 
evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) 
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. ·1, ·18 ("1999)); see aiso State v. Perry, 150 idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 
961, 979 (2010). 
Even if the district court erred in permitting the introduction of the state's 
proffered I.R.E. 404(b) evidence and expert testimony, such error is harmless. 
The state relies, in part, on the arguments set forth in Section 0.2., supra, and 
incorporates those arguments herein by reference. In addition, the state notes 
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that the facts of this case stand in contrast to those in Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 
227 P .3d 918. As in this case, the state's case in Johnson hinged on the 
credibility of the victim. kl at 669, 227 P.3d at 923. However, in Johnson the 
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence consisted of a separate victim testifying about sexual 
abuse inflicted upon her by Johnson many years earlier. kl In concluding that 
the admission of that evidence was not harmless, the Court held, "Evidence of 
prior sexual misconduct with young children is so prejudicial that there is a 
reasonable possibility this error contributed to Johnson's conviction." kl Here, 
the case also hinged on T.P.'s credibility. However, unlike Johnson, the 
challenged evidence did not show any acts of prior sexual abuse, but instead 
was evidence that Coleman had on prior occasions pushed T.P.'s physical and 
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misconduct with P., much less with any other children. Even if the I.R. 
404(b) evidence "painted Mr. Coleman in a very unfavorab,e light" (Appellant's 
brief, p .17), there is no reasonable possibility that the jury convicted Coleman of 
the charged sex offense merely because he violated T.P.'s boundaries on two 
prior occasions. For these reasons, even if the district court erred in admitting the 




The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Coleman guilty of sexual abuse of a child under the 
age of 16. 
DATED this 9th day of August 2011. 
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